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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mary, a thirty-four-year-old single mother, spends all day and half 
the night working her two minimum wage jobs to provide for her 
fourteen-year-old son, Stephen, and her three-year-old daughter, 
Danielle. Ever since their father was killed a year ago, Mary has had to 
pick up the slack. She comes home and gets four hours of sleep per night 
in their Section 8 housing that she got with the voucher the government 
gave her. She cannot do it all herself; she needs Stephen to step up and 
help take care of little Dani. Stephen has for the last year. Although 
Stephen has taken responsibility for the last year, Mary knows that she 
cannot force Stephen to be a parent at fourteen; Stephen has to be able to 
still do fourteen-year-old things too. 
It is winter break during Stephen’s freshman year of high school. 
Dani is still in preschool/daycare during the break some days. Stephen 
has taken to wanting to stay the night at his friends’ houses recently and 
did so last night. This morning Stephen was still at his friend’s’ house, so 
Mary had to get up a little earlier to get Dani ready. After sleeping 
through two of her alarms and only getting three and a half hours of 
sleep, Mary barely has enough time to get Dani prepared for daycare. 
With her tired, bloodshot eyes, Mary drops off a messy, sick, Dani 
without her lunch, her hair brushed, or a jacket. The teacher hears Dani 
mention to another student that “her mommy forgot to take her to her 
doctor’s appointment yesterday.” 
As a mandatory reporter, the teacher of the preschool called Child 
Protective Services (“CPS”). The social worker assigned to the case 
begins to investigate. The social worker comes while Stephen is at his 
friend’s home for a couple of days and notices that the mother is never 
home, lives in a rough area with her two children, and the house is an 
absolute mess. The social worker files a dependency petition with the 
superior court and takes Dani into protective custody. Twenty-four hours 
later, at the initial hearing, the mother tells her story, but the problem is 
that she has admitted that she cannot care for the child on her own and 
that she has no immediate family. The court decides to detain Dani, 
meaning she is removed from Mary’s custody and placed in a temporary 
home. 
Fifteen days later, the court holds the mandatory jurisdictional 
hearing and finds under subdivision (b) of the California Welfare and 
Institution Code section 300 that Dani is a dependent within the 
jurisdiction of the court. The court can obtain jurisdiction over Dani 
under subdivision (b) due to Mary’s negligent failure to provide Dani 
with adequate clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. Because the court 
detained Dani, the disposition hearing must occur within ten days, but 
80 CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
ten days is not enough time for Mary to have changed the situation 
whatsoever. 
Six months comes and goes, and Mary is treading water paying for 
the housing, paying for meals, giving Stephen his allowance, trying to 
get the house clean, and taking a few shifts off per month to get to her 
visitation times with Dani. At the Six-Month Review Hearing, Dani 
continues to be detained because the court is not convinced by a 
preponderance standard that enough has changed to dispel the concern 
that Dani is at risk. 
Six more months pass by. Mary has managed to trade her day-job 
for another job with growth potential. The judge likes the improvement, 
but nothing has really changed in regard to her ability to care for Dani. 
At the twelve-month review hearing, Dani remains in custody, but the 
court decides to continue the permanency hearing until the eighteen-
month point because there is a chance Mary could regain custody. 
Six months later—eighteen months after the disposition hearing 
where the judge ruled Dani must be taken into custody as a dependent— 
parental rights are at issue. Mary got promoted at her new job, but it has 
not been long enough for her to afford to quit her late-shift, minimum-
wage job. This is Mary’s last chance to show the court that her parental 
rights should not be terminated. Stephen attends the hearing and tells the 
judge how much he stepped up in the past to help take care of Dani. 
Mary’s attorney argues that this is the exact case where the sibling 
exception to the termination of parental rights under California’s Welfare 
and Institution Code section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) applies. If the attorney 
can show this exception applies to Dani, she will be returned to Mary 
rather than Mary’s parental rights being terminated. To show how this 
exception applies, the attorney must prove several things to the judge. 
First, there must be a significant sibling bond between Dani and Stephen. 
Second, the termination of parental rights must substantially interfere 
with that sibling relationship. Third, that substantial interference with the 
sibling relationship must cause detriment to the dependent child. Finally, 
if the judge decides that the detriment due to the separation from the 
sibling outweighs the benefits that the dependent child would receive 
from the permanency of adoption, then the exception applies. 
Mary’s attorney puts Dani up on the stand who tells the judge how 
much she loves Stephen, that she will be sad if she doesn’t go home with 
Stephen, how Stephen is the one who taught her to tie her shoes, how 
Stephen is the one who taught her how to make cereal, how Stephen is 
the one who walks her to daycare and watches Saturday morning 
cartoons with her. But to no avail, because although the judge says the 
separation will not be good for Dani, it also will not cause detriment 
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either. Even if the separation did cause detriment, it just does not 
outweigh the benefits of adoption. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A child is a dependent under the court’s jurisdiction if the child 
falls within any of the exceptions enumerated within the California 
Welfare and Institutions Code. Once jurisdiction has been established, a 
hearing is held where the judge decides in a disposition hearing whether 
the child will remain in the custody of the parents or enter the foster care 
system. Unless “the court finds by clear and convincing evidence” that 
the dependency situation falls within one of the seventeen exceptions to 
the rule, parents must be provided with services to help them reunite with 
the dependent child.1 
After the disposition hearing, if the child remains in the custody of 
the parents, the dependency status is dismissed. However, if the child is 
removed, two hearings are held: the six-month hearing and the twelve-
month hearing.2 Reunification can occur at these hearings depending on 
the judge’s subjective determination of the parent’s progress with 
services and whether any goals the judge has required are met, such as 
completion of rehab or domestic violence classes.3 
The six-month hearing requires the child to be returned to the 
parent’s custody unless the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the child is still at substantial risk.4 However, the twelve-
month hearing is a permanency hearing meant to determine the 
permanent plan for the dependent child.5 “If the child is not returned to a 
parent . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held pursuant to section 
366.26 in order to determine whether adoption, or . . . another planned 
permanent living arrangement is the most appropriate plan for the 
child.”6 This hearing is referred to colloquially as the “Two-Six” hearing, 
due to the statute section requiring the hearing.7 
At these hearings, including the “Two-Six,” the court must return 
the child to the custody of the parents unless “the return of the child to 
his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of 
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 
                                                                                                             
 1 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(b)(1-17) (Deering 2020). 
 2 See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.21(e)(1); 366.21(f)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 3 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.25(a)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 4 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.21(e)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 5 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 3616.21(f)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 6 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.25(a)(3) (Deering 2020). 
 7 See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 (Deering 2020). 
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the child.”8 “The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that 
detriment.”9 If after the Two-Six hearing the court is still unable to 
reunite the parent with the child, parental rights will be terminated, and a 
permanent plan will be determined.10 
“Adoption . . . is the permanent plan preferred by the legislature.”11 
However, the Agency must show “by a clear and convincing standard, 
that it is likely the child will be adopted.”12 “If the court finds a minor 
cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if 
parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent 
plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to 
the minor under one of five specified exceptions;”13 one of which is the 
sibling exception.14 
The sibling exception provides that if “[t]here would be substantial 
interference with a child’s sibling relationship,” the court shall not 
terminate parental rights.15 “To show a substantial interference with a 
sibling relationship, the parent must show the existence of a significant 
sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the 
child.”16 To determine whether interference would be substantial, the 
court should consider: 
[T]he nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not 
limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same 
home, whether the child shared significant common experiences 
or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether 
ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the 
child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit 
of legal permanence through adoption.17 
If, and only if, a judge is convinced there is a significant sibling 
bond and a substantial interference could occur to that bond due to the 
removal which causes a detriment to the dependent, does the judge 
                                                                                                             
 8 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.22(a)(1); 366.25(a)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 9 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.22(a)(1); 366.25(a)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 10 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 (Deering 2020). 
 11 In re Autumn H., 27 Cal. App. 4th 567, 573 (1994); In re Heather B., 9 Cal. App. 
4th 535, 546 (1992). 
 12 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1) (Deering 2020); see also In re Autumn H., 
27 Cal. App. 4th 567 (1994); In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th 942, 947 (2002). 
 13 In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th at 947 (citing § 366.26 (c)(1)); In re Jamie R., 90 
Cal. App. 4th 766, 773, (2001)). 
 14 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 15 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) (Deering 2020). 
 16 In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th at 952. 
 17 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) (Deering 2020). 
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“weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship 
against the benefit the child would receive from the permanency of 
adoption.”18 
Logically, the sibling exception would only be relevant to a child 
found to be a dependent under subsection (b) of California Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 300, like Dani, because the protection from any 
physical or mental abuse that rises to the level of the other subsections 
will almost certainly outweigh the detriment from interference with the 
sibling bond. Subsection (b) states the child can be found to be a 
dependent if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that 
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of” 
neglect by the parent.19 Additionally, if one child is found to be a 
dependent under this subsection, but their sibling is not, it is likely due to 
an age gap large enough that the children require different amounts of 
care and attention, similar to the situation between Dani and Stephen.20 
The purpose of the Welfare and Institutions Code for dependent 
children “is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who 
are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being 
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and 
physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that 
harm.”21 When children are treated poorly or inadequately cared for to 
the point that the court considers the child a dependent within the court’s 
jurisdiction, it is hard to justify any exception to removing the child from 
their parents’ custody. It is hard to justify leaving the child to be abused 
or neglected because no child deserves to be treated in that manner. If an 
exception to the termination of parental rights, such as the sibling 
exception, were to unequivocally undermine the purpose of the chapter, 
it would be counterproductive. 
The sibling exception does not undermine the purpose of the 
chapter. Although separation has several benefits, “the most obvious 
being the immediate safety of the child,”22 separation can have  
“profound [detrimental] effect[s] on [children],” as well.23 Currently, the 
                                                                                                             
 18 In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th at 952 (citing § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v)). 
 19 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(b)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 20 These distinctions do not affect the analysis or recommendations contained herein. 
 21 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300.2 (Deering 2020). 
 22 Practice Notes for North Carolina’s Child Welfare Workers, Child. Serv., 
http://www.practicenotes.org/vol2_no4/cspnv2_4.pdf , (last visited July 3, 2018) 
 23 Sarah Farnsworth, Children Separated from Siblings in Foster Care Feel 
‘Powerless, Anxious’, CREATE Foundation Study Finds, ABCNEWS, (June 14, 
2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-15/children-separated-from-siblings-in-
foster-care-feel-powerless/6546110. 
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judge must decide whether the benefits of separation outweigh the 
detriment. Since the judge is the sole finder of fact in these cases, judicial 
bias can affect the decision. 
Proponents of the current system will argue that, in many cases, 
eliminating this judicial bias from the determination of detriment may 
not change the outcome of removal due to the overwhelming need to 
separate the child from their parents. Neglectful parenting, for example, 
can cause an internal struggle of “self-worth and value.”24 Further, both 
“abuse and neglect have an adverse effect on children’s brain 
development.”25 Traumatic “experiences alter the functioning of an adult 
brain . . . [but] abuse and neglect can impact a child’s emotional 
development” and alter their brain’s framework.26 Abuse can have 
mental and emotional effects, but the “[p]hysical consequences range 
from minor injuries to severe brain damage and even death.”27 Although 
abuse is “the most damaging . . . [i]gnoring or neglecting a child’s needs 
can create . . . mental health problems,” as well.28 
However, this Article does not argue that all, or even that a 
significant amount of dependency proceedings involving the sibling 
exception, are incorrect. Nor does this Article argue the sibling exception 
should be given more weight than adoption. It argues that the sibling 
relationship should be given a just amount of weight to further the true 
purpose of dependency: to find the best option for the child and “not 
disrupt the family unnecessarily or intrude inappropriately into family 
life.”29 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The current system for determining if and how the sibling exception 
applies is problematic in multiple ways. The system is riddled with the 
potential for (A) bias from judges, expert witnesses, and others involved 
in the proceedings; (B) improper weighing of facts and arguments; and 
(C) improper use of facts, making the current process inadequate to 
                                                                                                             
 24 Karyl McBride, Ph.D., The Long-Term Impact of Neglectful Parents: The Lifelong 
Effects of Childhood Neglect, Psych. Today (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-legacy-distorted-love/201708/the-long-
term-impact-neglectful-parents. 
 25 McBride, supra note 24. 
 26 McBride, supra note 24. 
 27 National Research Council, Understanding Child Abuse and Neglect, 208 (Nat’l 
Academies Press eds., 1993), https://www.nap.edu/read/2117/chapter/6. 
 28 McBride, supra note 24. 
 29 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300 (Deering 2020). 
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further the purpose of dependency law when evaluating the sibling 
exception. 
A. Bias 
Everything is affected by some bias, even if it is only unconscious 
experiential bias. It is because of bias that nearly all trials provide the 
option of having a jury. During dependency trials, however, this bias is 
not mitigated in any way, which needs to change. 
Bias does not necessarily carry the colloquial negative connotation 
involving ‘prejudice,’ it just requires preference. “Bias is a tendency to 
prefer one person or thing to another, and to favor that person or thing.”30 
There are multiple kinds of bias,31 “[b]ut experiential bias is inescapable, 
affecting everyone who’s ever had an experience.”32 “‘[E]xperiential bias 
is largely self-evident; people make decisions based on what they have 
learned from their experiences.”33 There are three types of bias that occur 
in adversarial settings: “(1) conscious bias, (2) unconscious bias, and (3) 
selection bias.”34 Experiential bias is typically an unconscious bias. 
Unconscious bias includes confirmation bias—which causes “people to 
pay more attention to information that confirms their existing belief 
system and disregard that which is contradictory.”35 Experts believe that 
the mind’s subconscious is responsible for eighty percent or more of the 
thought processes,36 thereby making it difficult to escape unconscious 
bias. 
1. Judicial Bias 
The courts are split as to whether the ending of the sibling 
relationship would cause detriment. The lack of consistent outcomes in 
cases with similar facts (and even inconsistent opinions about the same 
facts such as the In re L.Y.L. case discussed below) shows the system’s 
need for change. The courts in the following two cases examine the same 
                                                                                                             
 30 Bias, Collins English Dictionary (10th ed. 2010). 
 31 See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) 
Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 451, 454 (2007) (discussing the types 
of bias); see also Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III Judges: 
Geography, Identity, and Bias, 79 Mo. L. Rev. 119 (2014); Kathleen Nalty, Strategies for 
Confronting Unconscious Bias, 45 Colo. Law. 45 (2016). 
 32 Rush, supra note 31. 
 33 Rush, supra note 31. 
 34 Bernstein, supra note 31. 
 35 Nalty, supra note 31. 
 36 Nalty, supra note 31. 
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child and relationship but have different ideas as to how the sibling 
exception applied. 
The trial court in In re L.Y.L. (hereinafter “L.Y.L.”) found that the 
sibling exception did not apply, and the appellate court affirmed.37 The 
court ruled L.Y., a four-year-old, and J.R., the younger brother, were 
dependents under section 300(b) and removed them from L., the 
mother.38 In the trial court, the social worker said, “L.Y. loved J.R. and 
they were very close. L.Y. said she would be sad if J.R. lived with L. and 
would miss him and worry about his safety. L.Y. and J.R had a 
relationship and had lived together most of their lives.”39 Aside from 
“being sad”, the court found “no evidence that L.Y. . . .would suffer 
detriment if the relationship ended.”40 Due to the inability of this child to 
express her feelings any more accurately than “sad,” the court concluded 
that the mother had “not sustained her burden of proof that termination of 
her parental rights to L.Y. would substantially interfere with L.Y.’s 
sibling relationship with J.R.”41 However, the court continued with the 
analysis and went on to find that “[v]aluing L.Y.’s continuing 
relationship with J.R. over adoption would deprive her of the ability to 
belong to a family, which is not in her best interests.”42 More 
specifically, it concluded that “[i]f parental rights are terminated here, 
L.Y. gains a permanent home through adoption …” so “the benefits of 
adoption outweighed the benefits of the [sic] continuing L.Y.’s 
relationship with J.R., even if it be assumed [sic] that termination of 
parental rights would result in a substantial interference with the sibling 
relationship.”43 
The court in In re Jacob S. (hereinafter “Jacob S.”) disagreed with 
the conclusion the court came to in L.Y.L.44 The Jacob S. court “[found] 
In re L.Y.L., instructive to a point.”45 However, it concluded L.Y.L. was 
wrong in “that a child’s ‘sadness’ can never satisfy the substantial 
detriment test.”46 The Jacob S. court reasoned that “‘[s]adness’ is often 
all a young child can express.”47 An adult would say “‘[t]his will make 
                                                                                                             
 37 In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th 942, 947 (2002). 
 38 Id. at 946. 
 39 Id. at 952. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 953. 
 43 In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th 942, 953 (2002). 
 44 In re Jacob S., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 1017 (2002). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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me sad, but I can deal with it,’ or, they can say ‘[t]his will devastate me; 
I can’t imagine life without my sibling and I don’t think I want to live 
without him or her,’ [whereas] a child is likely to describe both as 
making him, ‘sad.’”48 The court concluded that sadness can “satisfy the 
substantial detriment test.”49 
Both courts looked at L.Y.’s situation, and one found that ‘sadness’ 
was not enough. In contrast, the other court determined that just because 
a child cannot articulate feelings in any other way than “sadness,” a 
finding of detriment is not precluded. 
These differences in analysis and conclusions seem to come from 
either a misunderstanding of child psychology or judicial bias. Even if 
the argument is made that the differences are simply explained by 
differing interpretations of laws or facts, the interpretation is affected by 
unconscious experiential bias at a minimum. It is obvious why a judge 
with bias deciding anything, let alone a child’s future, is a problem, but 
even if the differences are due to a misunderstanding rather than bias, it 
is still a problem because a judge who does not understand child 
psychology should not decide whether one option would be more 
detrimental or beneficial to a child. 
Specifically, the bias here is likely the type of unconscious 
experiential bias known as “confirmation bias,” which causes a judge to 
conclude quickly and then search for facts and evidence to support that 
conclusion. But experiential bias can also be conscious when a judge 
interposes personal thoughts or preferences about growing up. These 
differing decisions could be the result of opinions regarding the 
importance of siblings or a true sibling relationship. 
The criteria for determining a “substantial interference” is 
subjective and allows a fact finder to mold the determination to its own 
beliefs with little restraint. The purpose of voir dire is to flush out bias 
from the jury. It is common knowledge that a jury of multiple people is 
selected for factual determinations to mitigate the experiential and 
unconscious bias from individual jurors such as “reasonable,” 
“substantial,” “detrimental,” or other similar terms. But here, a single 
judge determines whether the interference is “substantial” or if the 
dependent child suffered “detriment.” Then, the judge, who has not seen 
or has hardly seen the children interact and knows nothing else but the 
words that have been spoken to them from the parties about the situation, 
decides whether that detriment outweighs the benefits of the permanency 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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of adoption for that child. There are no mechanisms in the current sibling 
exception determinations to flush out bias from a judge. 
In some situations, “court-ordered sibling bond studies may be 
appropriate.”50 Proponents of the current system would likely argue this 
mechanism mitigates the judicial bias by providing neutral expert 
analysis. But this is not an adequate solution for a few reasons. For 
example, “the juvenile court [does] not have a sua sponte duty to 
consider the sibling relationship exception.”51 Second, if the sibling 
exception is not raised in the trial court, not only will it not be considered 
sua sponte, but “failure to raise the exception at the section 366.26 
hearing forfeits the issue for purposes of appeal.”52 
Additionally, court-ordered sibling bond studies do not solve the 
issue if the studies are not done in every applicable case, mainly because 
“in dependency matters . . . ‘considerations such as permanency and 
stability are of paramount importance.’”53 Placement for adoption or 
preventing the termination of parental rights to continue a sibling 
relationship is a question of permanency and stability. If court-ordered 
sibling bond studies were a valid counter-argument, the bias of the judge 
in determining which cases deserve a study would need to be flushed out 
by providing a study for each case in which a study is applicable 
regardless of whether the judge thinks it should be provided. Otherwise, 
the sibling bond studies are still used at the whim of the judge, subject 
directly to the judge’s bias. If a study was completed for each applicable 
case, then the sibling bond study would be mandatory, not court-ordered, 
and would solve the issue. 
The following two hypotheticals show how profoundly experiential 
bias may affect dependency proceedings. Each judge’s experiences could 
vary widely and unfairly prejudice the determination of what is best for 
the child. Situation A: The judge is an only child who never knew what it 
meant to have a sibling. The closest thing this judge had were friends, 
which the judge would only have what amounts to ‘visitation.’ To the 
judge in situation A, not living with your sibling and only visiting does 
not appear to affect the sibling bond because that’s all the judge had ever 
known, and he found was still close with his friends regardless. But what 
he doesn’t understand is the difference in the closeness of those 
friendships and a sibling relationship. How could he or she know? The 
relationship between siblings is unique and is difficult to explain or 
                                                                                                             
 50 In re Jacob S., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 1018 (2002). 
 51 In re Daisy D., 144 Cal. App. 4th 287, 292 (2006). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. (citing In re S.B. 32 Cal. 4th 1287, 1293 (2004)). 
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articulate. In all likelihood, this judge cannot even imagine what it’s like 
to have a sibling, let alone compare the detriment of losing that sibling to 
what benefit the child may gain in adoption, depending on if the family 
the child ends up with is even a good one. 
Situation B: a second judge is a twin. This judge would be very 
close to the sibling and could not imagine separation. The two were 
confused by other people while growing up, liked all the same things, 
and finished each other’s sentences. The twins were on all the same 
sports teams, had the same group of friends, and shared clothes. To this 
judge, living, growing, and teaching each other is everything to the 
sibling bond, which would be impossible to foster with only visitation.  
These two judges could look at the same case and arrive at the complete 
opposite determination—and neither one may be correct. Ultimately, 
judges are left with vast discretion in dependency cases by acting as the 
presiding judge and the fact finder. This allows the experiences of the 
judge to taint their view of the situation whether by conscious or 
unconscious avenues. 
2. Social Worker Bias 
Social workers in dependency cases are not independent. Social 
workers are employed by the Department of Children and Family 
Services (“DCFS”). DCFS workers detain the children, file petitions to 
remove, develop their allegations, provide services, and investigate the 
parents.54 These social workers essentially work against the parents. 
They are the people who initiate the proceedings and recommend 
removal from the parents. There may be no one more biased towards the 
termination of parental rights in a dependency proceeding than the social 
workers.  
In a dependency proceeding, social workers are acting as both an 
arresting officer and district attorney (“DA”) would in a criminal 
matter—two instances in which no one would argue that the DA or 
arresting officer is not biased. Arresting officers initially bring the matter 
into the system and recommend the initiation of proceedings just like the 
social worker petitions for the court to take jurisdiction and DA’s have 
the burden of proving guilt just like the social worker has the burden of 
proving the child will be at risk if returned.  
Social workers are the prosecutors and arresting officers of 
dependency proceedings. The inherent bias of a social worker’s opinion 
makes their report regarding the sibling exception not entirely credible. 
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The potential likelihood for an education and experience gap and bias 
makes the social workers’ reports an inadequate evaluation of the sibling 
exception for the court. 
3. Expert Bias 
Sometimes attorneys hire experts to testify regarding the sibling 
relationship, the detriment to the child of being separated from their 
sibling, or other things regarding the exception, but experts are paid to 
appear on a client’s behalf just like an attorney. No reasonable person 
would ever disagree that an attorney is biased towards the side they are 
paid by; in fact, attorneys are essentially required to be biased.55 Even if 
they were not, attorneys are biased toward the party paying them because 
that is how they make their living. Just the same, that is how experts 
make their living. Therefore, experts are generally inherently biased. 
There are three main types of expert bias that occur in adversarial 
settings: “(1) conscious bias, (2) unconscious bias, and (3) selection 
bias.”56 “[C]onscious bias arises when ‘hired guns’ adapt their opinions 
to the needs of the attorney who hires them.”57 However, the most 
prevalent bias in this situation is likely unconscious bias. “As Sir George 
Jessel pointed out in an English judicial opinion over a century ago, 
‘[u]ndoubtedly there is a natural bias to do something serviceable for 
those who employ you and adequately remunerate you.’”58 
Hired experts are biased towards the hiring party. For example, 
forensic experts often have a desire to “reach conclusions that assist the 
prosecution,” because “prosecutors are often responsible for evaluating 
forensic scientists’ performances.”59 Similarly, attorneys who hire 
experts evaluate them and decide whether to hire the expert or refer other 
attorneys to the expert in the future. These hired experts would risk 
future employment if their testimony did not assist the party who hired 
them. The experts depend on having future work; it is how they pay the 
bills. 
Often there is another expert with equivalent qualifications on the 
other side of an issue supporting the opposite conclusion due to this same 
“hired-gun” bias. Therefore, as most judges and attorneys know, a judge 
cannot take what an expert testifies to as the truth due to these types of 
loyalty biases. Additionally, the view that there is one expert on each 
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side of the issue is the third type of bias: selection bias. 60 This type of 
bias misleads the judge (or in other cases jury) into thinking there is a 
split in expert opinion about a subject. A case could be about whether 
gravity is in fact real with an expert on each side; one saying it is real, 
and the other disagreeing. The truth is there could be one million experts 
in the world that agree gravity is real and only one that does not. The 
attorney opposing gravity searched and found the only expert to support 
them. Therefore, hired experts bring too much bias with them to resolve 
the issue of bias and educational inadequacy in the child psychology of 
judges. 
B. Improper Weighing of Facts and Arguments 
1. Comments and Testimony by Dependents 
It is common knowledge that, generally, children do not have the 
necessary experiences to express emotions completely and accurately 
because they have not matured to the point where they understand their 
feelings or how the consequences of their choices will affect them in the 
future.61 Emotional competence requires many skills62 which children 
have not had the necessary experience or lifespan to develop. “Children 
have to learn these expressive strategies.”63 As a result, what children 
desire and what is best for them do not always line us64—in fact, they 
usually do not. These are major reasons that minors’ attorneys are 
charged with advocating not only what the child desires but also what is 
best for the child, even if it diverges from the aforementioned desires. 
A child’s ignorance of the consequences of their choices is the 
primary reason the legislature places age requirements on voting and the 
purchasing of controlled substances like alcohol, tobacco, and 
marijuana.65 Furthermore, children are unable to compare the long-term 
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consequences of their present choices to the short-term benefits, or in 
some cases, even foresee those consequences.66 It is not an uncommon 
story for children to try to run away from home because they are upset at 
their parents for something such as taking away a video game. If children 
could understand the long-term effects of their choices, no child would 
run away. The child would realize without the parents, the child would 
not have the video game, and even if the child did, the game is worthless 
without electricity or the family television. 
Given children’s lack of emotional intelligence and understanding 
of consequences, minors are appointed counsel by the court in 
dependency proceedings67 whereas adults are allowed to proceed pro se 
in court. The court may only refuse to appoint counsel in dependency 
proceedings if the child “would not benefit from the appointment of 
counsel,”68 but “the court has a nondiscretionary duty to at least consider 
the appointment.”69 Generally, children are not mature or intelligent 
enough to properly conduct or advocate for themselves. Hence the lower 
standard of care for children in tort law70 and their right to revoke in 
contract law.71 
All of these laws and regulations evidence that judges must know 
children cannot accurately express how meaningful a relationship is to 
them whether it be because they may be incapable of expressing 
emotions intelligently or do not understand their own emotions enough to 
know how important a relationship is or will be in the future. Yet, in 
addition to the judicial bias evidenced in L.Y.L. and Jacob S above, these 
cases also show improper use of these types of rash statements made by 
emotional children. 
The court in Jacob S. took jurisdiction over the mother’s “five 
children—Jessica, age [fourteen;] Autumn, age [eleven;] Noah, age 
[nine;] Jacob, age [six;] and Matthew, age [three]”—under § 300(b)72 
when the mother “checked herself into a hospital for mental health 
treatment without first assuring adequate supervision for Noah, who is a 
quadriplegic and requires around-the-clock care, . . . because [the mother 
was] not adequately trained to care for [Noah]” which “created a 
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dangerous situation.”73 Jacob showed a clear desire to live with his 
siblings and Autumn said that Jessica was “bossy and grumpy,” and she 
“was angry with Jessica and did not want to see her,” even though 
Autumn “clearly wanted to maintain relationships with [her] siblings.”74 
Autumn and Jessica were close in age and “used to work together to take 
care of their brothers, performing such tasks as cooking for them and 
changing their diapers.”75 The court concluded that Autumn would suffer 
a detriment if her sibling relationship with Jessica ended, but that the 
sibling exception did not apply to Jacob. 
The court in Jacob S. hardly mentioned Jacob’s apparent desire to 
live with his siblings in determining the balance between the detriment of 
separation and “the benefits of adoption,”76 and did not allow Autumn’s 
rash comments to affect its opinion about the effects of the interference 
with her sibling relationship would have upon her. In L.Y.L., on the other 
hand, the court relied on the fact that L.Y. “wanted to be adopted even if 
that ended her relationship with [her sibling].”77 The judge in L.Y.L. 
accepted L.Y.’s portrayal of her feelings as true and accurate, and even 
relied on it in the disposition of the case. These differences in theory of 
how to handle the children’s comments about what they want can be 
explained by either a lack of understanding of how children act and 
express themselves or by confirmation bias: judges looking for the 
evidence that supports the outcome the judge subconsciously desires.78 
C. Continued Visitation Does Not Eliminate Interference with the 
Relationship 
Courts, social workers, and minors’ counsel sometimes argue that 
post-adoption visitation is sufficient to remove interference with the 
sibling bond because the children are still given the opportunity to 
interact and stay in touch with their siblings.79 These agencies argue the 
brief visits with which separated siblings are provided allow the children 
adequate time to maintain the sibling relationship. They claim that once a 
week for a few hours after school does not interfere with a relationship—
a relationship that used to mean seeing each other every morning and 
evening, and sharing multiple meals per day with each other, such as 
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94 CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
breakfast and dinner. This amount of time established by the court is 
inadequate at best.  
“Sibling relationships help children achieve developmental 
milestones as well as provide emotional support, companionship, and 
comfort.”80 In a sibling relationship, one sibling’s problems are the other 
sibling’s problems as well. The siblings work together to solve their 
issues, and they grow together. It is being able to count on the person 
based on the bond created through hard times and good times. Children 
“use their [sibling] relationships to understand who they are;”81 and those 
siblings “remain important figures throughout [the children’s] lives.”82 
Furthermore, “research indicates that biological relatedness is not 
associated with young children’s perceptions of closeness to siblings; 
being a full, half, or step-sibling did not influence their perception of 
closeness.”83 Therefore, post-adoption visitation transforms the sibling 
relationship into a friendship because children do not recognize 
biological relatedness; rather, they see the relationship at face value. 
If a child visits their sibling, as one would visit a friend, the child is 
viewed as a friend regardless of DNA. The strength of the sibling bond 
does not come from simply knowing a biological sibling but living with 
the person and sharing experiences with that person. It lies with growing 
up day by day with that person—not just the limited experiences that 
come with friendship. The sibling bond cannot be maintained and 
protected if it is not a sibling relationship. Therefore, post-adoption 
visitation with a biological sibling is inadequate to maintain the sibling 
relationship and minimizes interference with the sibling bond. 
Currently, “[t]here are no statutes providing the juvenile court with 
authority to grant dependents the right to visit with nondependent 
siblings.”84 In In re Luke H., for example, the court obtained jurisdiction 
over Luke under section 300(c).85 The “[m]other refused to allow 
visitation between Luke and [his sister],” so Luke filed a petition to 
modify the orders to allow visitation.86 However, “[t]he juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction over mother (the sister’s custodial parent) does not provide 
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the court the adequate power to grant that request. What matters is that 
the juvenile court had no statutory authority to enter a visitation order 
regarding [the sister,] a nondependent sibling.”87 “[W]hile the 
subdivision authorized Luke, a dependent child, to file a petition to 
change a court order, it did not authorize the juvenile court to issue an 
order affecting a child outside the court’s jurisdiction.”88 This is the 
typical sibling situation when the sibling exception would have any 
applicable value: one or more dependent children and at least one non-
dependent.89 Thus, the court cannot mitigate the effects of separation and 
foster the development of the sibling relationship because it cannot grant 
visitation.90 
D. Unenforceable Promises of a Commitment to Visitation Cannot Show 
a Lack of Interference 
The trial court in In re D.O. (hereinafter “D.O.”), “explained that 
the sibling relationship exception ‘really only comes into the light . . . if 
there is a demonstrated interference’ with such a relationship.”91 The trial 
court found, and the appellate court agreed, that the paternal grandmother 
“would [not] in any way interfere” with the sibling relationship due to 
the “paternal grandmother’s proven track record of facilitating visits with 
D.O. and the Siblings.”92 The trial court essentially found that the sibling 
exception did not apply to D.O. because “there [was] absolutely no 
evidence that the bond would be interfered with” based (at least partially 
if not relying completely) on93 the promises of the currently-monitored 
caregivers. The appellate court held that the determination cannot 
exclusively rely on the commitment of caregivers to visitation,94 yet 
many courts find that promises preclude interference with the bond 
because the siblings will have continued visitation,95 or at least use it as 
support of the finding as the court did here. 96 
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Courts often accept caregivers’ promises of a commitment to 
visitation between siblings due to their lack of authority to force 
visitation. However, these promises are unenforceable and speculative at 
best. Courts recognize that they “would not be able to compel the 
prospective adoptive parents to maintain contact with the remaining 
sibling.”97 These courts cannot order the visitation regardless of whether 
a party has promised the visitation on its own or not. Furthermore, even 
if the court had the power to force visitation while it had jurisdiction over 
the case, these caregivers will not be subject to the power of the court 
once the adoption process has been completed. Once they have adopted 
the child, it is their discretion that controls what is best for the child, 
including visitation with a sibling. 
The adoptive caregiver’s “track record” will show a commitment to 
the facilitation of visits, however, the “track record” is not an honest 
intimation of future commitment. The caregiver needs the backing of the 
agency to be able to adopt the child. The child is currently a dependent 
and under the jurisdiction of the court, so the caregivers are being 
scrutinized as much as the parents. The caregivers will act exemplary 
when there are consequences for their malperformance, but this does not 
say much for how they will act once the adoption is complete. If it was 
an adequate indicator, would former dependents ever be molested by 
adoptive parents? 
E. Testimony and Reports by Social Workers 
When a sibling relationship is at issue in a case, social workers 
typically provide their opinion on the strength of the relationship and 
whether that bond could “qualify as a sibling exception to adoption under 
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E).”98 In order to obtain the job, these 
social workers must at minimum obtain a bachelor’s in social work,99 
and once they do receive it, they exclusively deal with dependent or 
troubled youth. However, these social workers are nowhere near experts 
on sibling relationships or detriment; specifically, they are not therapists. 
The education requirements to be employed as a therapist are much more 
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robust.100 A therapist must have a bachelor’s degree and master’s degree 
at a minimum, plus thousands of hours of supervised experience.101 
Additionally, a therapist must pass both the California Law and Ethics 
Exam (“LMLE”) and the Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist 
clinical exam (“LMCE”).102 A social worker’s knowledge and education 
in this area are not adequate compared to a licensed therapist’s; therefore, 
their evaluations of the sibling bond, the interference caused by 
separation, and the detriment caused by termination cannot be substituted 
for a licensed therapist’s. 
F. Attorney Reliance 
Proponents of the current system may argue that attorneys must 
properly advocate for their clients, so judges can rely on attorneys 
litigation skills to ensure they have the necessary information to rule on a 
case. The idea is that each attorney will seek out and provide the best 
argument for their client, leading the judge to the fairest solution. But, 
for the most part, no attorney has specialized knowledge or education in 
the psychological development of children in general, let alone the 
effects of sibling relationships or bonds, which means they are inept in 
the psychological effects of separation. An attorney has a law degree and 
is not required to have a Bachelor of Arts in psychology or child 
development, or a master’s in the like. There are cases where attorneys 
fail to either object to a “decision [an expert knows] would exacerbate, if 
not cause, child abuse and additional trauma” to the child or to “advocate 
in court for an expert witness to provide information” regarding the 
separation.103 Ultimately, attorneys’ ideas and opinions are not sufficient 
to provide the most adequate arguments when it comes to sibling 
relationships. 
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G. Improper Use of Facts 
1. Age is not a Meaningful Factor 
Many courts conclude that the sibling exception does not apply due 
to the age of the dependent child. When the dependent child is younger, 
the “experiences the children shared with [the older sibling] would not be 
as meaningful to them . . . as the experiences were to [the older 
sibling].”104 This is not an unusual mistake, in fact, “many people assume 
that very young children are not affected at all, erroneously believing that 
they are too young to know or remember what has happened. However, 
even in the earliest phases of infant and toddler development, clear 
associations have been found between exposure to violence and post-
traumatic symptoms and disorders.”105 
“Behavioral problems of childhood . . . typically emerge in the 
early years and are associated with deficits in social skills, emotional 
regulation, frustration tolerance, and social problem solving.”106 “The 
preschool years are a key developmental period in which skills essential 
for later academic and social success are acquired and honed.”107 
“Because of the very rapid and complex changes during the first three 
years of life, developmental factors will influence the young child’s 
perception and experience of the trauma associated with violence.”108 “In 
a recent study . . . clear evidence emerged of PTSD symptoms in children 
under the age of four years.”109 
The use of a child’s young age as a factor lessening the detriment 
caused by separation is either an excuse to give the sibling relationship 
less weight due to bias or an uninformed analysis. Age does not affect 
nor decrease a child’s response to the trauma experienced due to 
violence; it actually increases the detriment, so it is unwise to assume a 
child’s age affects the response to any other traumatic experiences in any 
other way. The children may not remember those experiences through 
memories and words, but those experiences give children of all ages 
subconscious knowledge of trust and attachment. To have those 
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relationships ripped out from under them may result in long-term effects 
the child does not—and may never—understand, thus, the lack of 
understanding does not equate with a lack of detriment. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Neutral, Third-Party Expert 
Dependents deserve to have an objective, independent expert 
determine what constitutes substantial interference.110 Children are our 
future, and their cognitive and mental capacities should be given the 
utmost care. The policy behind dependency and adoption is to do what is 
best for the child. If what is best for the child varies from judge to judge, 
which court’s conclusion, if any, is actually best for the child? 
Dependent children deserve to have the best choice for their future 
made whether or not the attorneys put the sibling exception at issue. One 
of the main benefits of adoption is the ability for the child to become part 
of a family, but a child who has everything ripped away from them may 
never have stability in relationships. Thus, these children may never feel 
a like or want to be part of the family, thereby nullifying this benefit. 
Tearing away everything children care about will cause the children to 
prevent themselves from becoming attached in the future to protect 
themselves from the same scenario, causing the main benefit of adoption 
to be void. A neutral, third-party therapeutic or psychological expert 
must evaluate each situation in order to provide the child with the best 
solution to the issues at hand, leading to the dependency finding. 
An objective analysis will allow for more consistent rulings which 
will provide data as to whether the choices are the best ones for the 
children. Child psychologists or therapists that are familiar with foster 
youth should evaluate the strength of the sibling bonds and the detriment 
that would result from the termination of parental rights and advise the 
court. 
B. Fair Balancing 
As discussed previously, the current balancing equation used fails 
to include an essential aspect of the sibling relationship in addition to the 
detriment of losing their parents. The current system balances the 
benefits of adoption with the detriment caused by the removal, but it 
does not address the loss of benefits that the siblings would gain as they 
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grow and live together; nor does it include the detriment caused by 
separation from the parents. 
Separation of a child from a parent who is the primary caregiver 
can cause an “intense, fear-based rage felt inside the [child].”111 Based on 
what is known “about child development, the brain, and trauma,” it is 
clear children “grow up with the shrapnel of this traumatic experience 
embedded in their minds.”112 In fact, children “separated from their 
parents at a young age had much less white matter . . . as well as much 
less grey matter” in their brain, which is required to transmit and process 
information.113 This often results in “delinquency, attention-deficits, 
shyness, and depression” in the adolescents114 and “interfere[s] with their 
ability to maintain stable and enduring love and work relationships” as 
adults.115 The CREATE Foundation performed a study and found that 
children who are separated from their siblings largely suffer the same 
effects.  
Children often take siblings for granted when they are together, but 
immediately upon separation, they care “more about staying in touch 
with their brothers and sisters than their parent.”116; this is because when 
children lose a sibling, they “feel ‘they have lost a part of 
themselves.’”117 Therefore, when a child is separated from both their 
parents and siblings, it “compounds the anxiety and pain they feel over 
separation.”118 When a dependent child who had siblings has parental 
rights terminated, the internal damage to the child when they are placed 
with adoptive parents can be more than twice as much as a child that was 
only removed from their parents. 
Adoption, as the permanent plan choice, is preferred by the 
legislature when the parents are not performing adequately as parents, so 
the benefits of adoption outweigh the detriment of separation. But, when 
non-dependent siblings are involved, the detriment of losing parents is 
taken out of the equation, and the detriment caused by sibling separation 
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is isolated in the weighing of detriment against adoptive benefits. The 
sibling exception implies that the court should ignore any other detriment 
in the equation.119 
Courts disregard the detriment of losing parents as well as the 
opportunity costs of not allowing the sibling bond/relationship to grow 
and develop; yet, it is weighed against the benefits of adoption which is 
inherently all-inclusive of the inverses of those detriments discussed 
above. The main benefit of adoption would be to remove the child from 
the neglectful or abusive household and provide the child with adoptive 
parents that are both supportive and nurturing. The effects on the child 
are compounded when the child loses both its parents and siblings, and 
that total detriment must be weighed against the benefits of adoption. 
On top of ignoring any additional detriment to the dependent child, 
the sibling exception “contains strong language creating a heavy burden 
for the party opposing adoption.”120 The statute requires that the court 
find “a ‘compelling reason’ for concluding that the termination of 
parental rights would be ‘detrimental’ to the child due to ‘substantial 
interference’ with a sibling relationship.”121 It requires a number of fact-
based determinations that all have a high standard of evidence. There 
must be a significant sibling bond. The termination of parental rights 
must cause a substantial interference. The interference must be 
detrimental to the dependent child. The detriment must be so harmful 
that it must outweigh the benefits of the permanency of adoption and 
create a compelling reason to halt the termination of parental rights. 
Between the isolation of the detriment and the high standard of evidence, 
the sibling bond is not given a fair chance in the evaluation. 
Sibling relationships can be an important avenue of maturity and 
growth for children. “The relationships people share with siblings are 
often the longest-lasting relationships they will have. Siblings are there 
from the beginning, and they are often still around after parents, and even 
spouses and children, are gone.”122 The loss of that relationship will not 
only cost the child more than the present detriment but what they could 
have gained in the future from it. So, if a court can speculate how much 
harm a child would suffer by remaining with the parent(s), it can and 
should speculate what benefits would be lost by terminating the sibling 
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relationship. Thus, these independent experts should not only consider 
the loss a child would suffer from separation from the sibling, but also 
the opportunity costs of not building upon that relationship in the future 
and the losses caused by separation from the parents. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The system as it currently exists is not properly formulated to 
provide a fair and accurate evaluation of the sibling exception. The 
purpose of dependency proceedings is to provide the child with 
permanent placement that will be the best choice for the child’s future. 
Currently, the system does not place that purpose at the forefront of its 
workings. The evaluation of the exception is inundated with bias. 
Further, through the determination of multiple elements, the final 
decision of whether the sibling exception applies is made by a single 
judge who, more than likely, has no hint of education regarding the 
psychological effects of separation or adoption on children. 
Recommendations are made to the court regarding the applicability of 
the sibling exception by the social worker who is the same party that 
filed the petition to remove the children from the parents’ care in the first 
place.  
Attorneys are left to make arguments that affect the future of this 
child and our country but, similar to judges, they do not have the 
adequate education to recognize and evaluate the most beneficial 
arguments. Furthermore, the use of experts to aid the attorneys in this 
task is unhelpful because the reports are not credible. Experts are known 
to have conscious and unconscious bias affecting their position on the 
issue; therefore, the court cannot accept the reports at face value. The 
sibling exception should be considered in every case in which it is 
applicable to ensure that the most beneficial choice for the child’s future 
is made. That choice cannot ignore the opportunity costs involved in the 
termination of parental rights due to the deterioration of the sibling 
relationship.  
There is much to gain for children by having a true sibling bond. 
Sibling relationships are important to a child’s development, so the 
prospective benefits they would gain by continuing that relationship in 
full force must be considered in the determination of relative weights of 
detriment and benefits of reunification or termination. By combining the 
separation from a sibling and separation from parents, a child’s 
development is so greatly impacted that an independent, third-party 
expert must aid the court in every applicable determination to ensure the 
best choice is made for the child’s future. Therefore, the system needs to 
use the balancing equation to consider both the detriment and the loss of 
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beneficial experiences that result from the ending of the sibling 
relationship through termination of parental rights; thus, the court could 
better ensure the best choice for the child’s future. 
 
